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  Although the traditional theory of the firm gave little attention to institutional 
detail, the common assumption about the units that engage in the production and sale of 
goods and services was that they are owned and controlled by individuals who provide 
risk-bearing capital and who hire the services of workers as one among several variable 
inputs.  Worker-run cooperatives had existed in small numbers at least since the industrial 
revolution, but the study of such firms using formal analytical tools awaited the added 
stimuli provided by the challenge of understanding collective farm performance in the 
Soviet Union and China and Yugoslavia’s experiment with worker-managed market 
socialism.  The models developed in the late 1950s and thereafter were subsequently 
applied not only to those cases but also to understanding worker-owned firms in 
industrial market economies, to investigating hypothetical economies consisting 
exclusively of worker-run firms, and to attempting to explain why worker control is 
relatively rare.  As studies on the topic multiplied, the term “labor-managed firm” came 
to be used by economists to describe an enterprise that operates under the ultimate control 
of those who work in it.   
 
  Such a definition of an LMF permits considerable variation in other dimensions.   
To qualify as an LMF, for example, an enterprise’s workers must have control in the 
sense that managers are appointed and can be removed by them or by their 
representatives.  But the degree of direct worker involvement in decision-making can 
vary, from the more direct democracy of small cooperatives to the representative 
structures of large Mondragon cooperatives or the now-defunct Yugoslav firms.  A 
frequent assumption is that the exercise of worker control follows “one worker one vote” 
lines, but the LMF concept has sometimes been extended to firms that include a class of 
workers lacking control rights.  Most importantly, perhaps, the term LMF has been 
applied both to firms in socialist economies in which the private ownership of capital is 
prohibited and the enterprise’s capital is the property of “society” or of a collective, and 
to worker-owned firms in capitalist economies, in which individual workers can hold 
property rights in their enterprise’s assets, for example through “partnership deeds,”  
“individual capital accounts,” or shares.   
 
The principal example of an LMF with “social capital” was the Yugoslav social 
enterprise, which arose from the application of new laws and principles to that country’s 
Soviet-style state enterprises.  Collective property was the prevailing legal notion applied 
to the land and equipment of collective farms in the Soviet Union, China, and other 
Communist states, and has also accounted for a portion of the assets of some Western 
worker-run firms.  The canonical example of “partnership deeds” is provided by worker-
owned plywood companies in the United States.  The capital account model was adopted 
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by the group of worker-owned enterprises centered in the town of Mondragon in the 
Basque province of Spain.  More hybrid cases with only elements of worker control, such 
as (a) the partial employee ownership of many American companies, (b) legal, medical, 
and other professional partnerships, (c) co-determination in Western Europe, and (d) the 
widespread employee ownership resulting from privatization programs in many transition 
economies, also continue to stimulate interest in the economic analysis of firms run by 
workers. 
 
  Although the economic analysis of worker-run firms was stimulated by the cases 
mentioned, interest in the concept appears to be explained by other factors as well.  
Normative dissatisfaction with the capitalist employment relationship, in which workers 
assume a subordinate role in the production process and lack claims on enterprise profits, 
can be found among leading economists ranging from John Stuart Mill and Leon Walras 
to James Meade and Jacques Drèze.  In his Principles of Political Economy, Mill, who 
dominated English political-economy in the mid-19
th century, wrote “To work at the 
bidding and for the profit of another, without any interest in the work—the price of their 
labor being adjusted by hostile competition, one side demanding as much and the other 
paying as little as possible—is not, even when wages are high, a satisfactory state to 
human beings of educated intelligence, who have ceased to think themselves naturally 
inferior to those whom they serve.”  He predicted the extinction of the capitalist firm 
(“There can be little doubt that the relation of masters and workpeople will be gradually 
superseded by partnership”) and opined that the result “would be the nearest approach to 
social justice, and the most beneficial ordering of industrial affairs for the universal good, 
which it is possible at present to foresee.”  Modern political theorists such as Carol 
Pateman and Robert Dahl have argued that self-government of the workplace by workers 
is an implied requirement of the principle of control of government by the governed, and 
that it would help to deepen democracy in more traditional political spheres. 
 
  Another source of interest in LMFs is the fact that the theoretical analysis of such 
firms promises insights into why the large majority of firms in market economies are 
established and controlled by investors rather than workers (Dow, 2003).  Whether that 
fact is to be attributed to social custom, to the exercise of economic power by the 
wealthy, to aversion to risk by the poor, or to other factors, seems important for judging 
policies such as the expansion of co-determination or the use of worker ownership in 
future privatizations.  It also has an important part to play in the ethical evaluation of the 
economic system as a whole. 
 
  The first wave of models of worker-management abstracted from issues of 
ownership and financing by assuming a fixed charge for capital or land, presumed to be 
rented by the firm but fixed in quantity in the short run.  By contrast, the number of 
worker-members was taken to be variable, and the firm’s main decision problem was to 
select a level of this input.  In the seminal model of Ward (1958) and in subsequent 
treatments by Domar (1966), Vanek (1970), Meade (1972) and others, the objective was 
taken to be maximizing revenue per worker net of capital, land, or other charges.  The 
first and most frequently noted finding of such models was that with the maximand being 
the (endogenous or firm-specific) net earnings of a variable input, output might not   3
respond normally to changes in the product price.  In particular, Ward showed that if 
labor is the only variable input, workers share net revenue on an equal basis, and the 
firm’s objective is to maximize the earnings of each worker employed (without concern 
for workers who might have to be expelled to achieve earnings maximization for those 
remaining), then an increase in the product price would reduce optimal employment and 
thus the firm’s output level.  An industry consisting entirely of worker-run firms would 
accordingly exhibit a downward rather than upward-sloping short-run supply curve, so 
that output would go down, rather than up, in response to increased demand (assuming 
that a short-run equilibrium is even possible).  Labor would be misallocated among firms 
in the short-run equilibrium of a labor-managed economy, since those with high marginal 
product of labor would have no incentive to accept workers from those with low marginal 
product.  As an added oddity, the firm would seek more workers if the cost of its fixed 
factor or a lump sum tax rose, and it would reduce its membership if the opposite 
occurred. 
 
Long run outcomes are less peculiar.  Abnormal returns would attract new capital 
investments by existing firms and entry of other firms into the industry, giving the long-
run supply curve a more conventional shape.  In the very long run, with both the number 
of firms and their utilization of all factors being variables, equilibrium behavior of labor-
managed and conventional firms would be identical (Drèze, 1976).  Even short-run 
perverse supply responses would be rendered unlikely by a variety of factors.  For 
example, Domar (1966) showed that the tendency of hypothetical LMFs to take on 
additional workers as output prices fell or as net revenue was reduced by higher charges 
for fixed factors, could be annulled by incorporating in the model the supply of labor 
facing a firm.  Other factors tending to weaken or reverse the “perverse output supply 
response” include (a) use of variable inputs additional to labor, (b) flexibility of working 
hours, (c) reallocation of labor between product lines in multi-product firms, (d) 
reluctance to vote for the expulsion of incumbent members, perhaps because the voters 
face similar probabilities of being selected for expulsion, and (e) tradable membership 
rights. 
 
Empirical research failed to provide evidence for backward supply responses by 
LMFs.  Chinese collective farms were found to increase their output in response to higher 
government-set prices.  Yugoslav firms were sometimes argued to be reluctant to take on 
new workers, in line with Ward model predictions, but no evidence has been adduced that 
they had insufficient flexibility over work hours or an inability to allocate workers among 
tasks and product lines so as to respond positively to better market conditions for a given 
product.  In what is probably the most rigorous study of the supply response of worker-
owned firms, that on U.S. plywood cooperatives by Craig and Pencavel (1992), the 
authors concluded that the firms’ output was significantly less responsive to product price 
changes than that of conventionally-owned competitors, but they rejected backward 
bending supply at high levels of significance. 
 
Property rights and investment incentives were another major concern of the LMF 
literature beginning in the late 1960s.  In Yugoslavia, workers were empowered to elect 
councils which selected and had governing authority over their companies’ managers, but   4
the capital stock of the company was legally owned “by society,” with workers having 
rights to current revenue but obligation to maintain and ideally to add to that stock.  
Furubotn and Pejovich (1970) demonstrated theoretically that with this rights structure, 
self-interested workers would privately value new investments in their company only 
insofar as they expected to remain employed there and have their pay enhanced by the 
resulting higher productivity.  For capital goods having a useful life exceeding the 
expected employment horizon of a worker, the privately appropriable rate of return must 
be adjusted downward to take into account truncation of the future earnings stream from 
the standpoint of the worker.  Furubotn and Pejovich argued that Yugoslavia avoided an 
otherwise-predicted dearth of investment only because government and Communist 
authorities continued to have considerable leverage over managers, and because the 
government encouraged companies to finance their investments with low cost loans from 
the state banks, although this had the effect of pumping money into the economy and 
thereby fueling inflation (Pejovich, 1969). 
 
Most economists studying the issue agreed that firms with social ownership of 
capital would suffer from a horizon problem of the sort that Furubotn and Pejovich 
identified.  More generally, Vanek (1977) argued that failure to consider the scarcity 
price of capital can lead to inappropriate choice of technology, a factor that he viewed as 
being of sufficient importance to explain the historical failure of experiments with 
workers’ management.  He noted, however, that this need not be a general feature of 
LMFs.  The truncation of the revenue stream that is considered when evaluating 
investments is a result not of worker-control but of assuming that workers are deprived of 
any and all rights to their investments’ returns after separation from their firm.  The 
problem could thus be ameliorated or eliminated entirely by several methods, for instance 
the calculation of a severance payment based on the capitalized value of each worker’s 
past contributions to their company’s capital stock. Another possibility is for the worker 
to sell his position as a partner or member of the firm in a market.  In a perfectly 
functioning membership market, the estimated remaining productivity or marketable 
value of physical and other assets created during the incumbent worker’s career with the 
firm would be incorporated in the sale price of the membership right.  Sertel (1982), Dow 
(1986), and Fehr (1993) demonstrated the theoretical ability of a membership market to 
eliminate the inefficiencies of worker control in other dimensions as well.  Pencavel 
(2001) and Dow (2003), however, point out the rarity of such markets and evidence of 
their imperfect functioning, suggesting this as another place to search for possible 
explanations of why LMFs are not more common. 
 
A much-discussed dimension of worker control and ownership is that of work 
incentives.  Vanek argued that as a means of motivating workers to give their full 
energies to their jobs, sharing profits is likely to be far superior to paying a fixed wage, 
since the worker on fixed pay receives the contractual wage regardless of how intensively 
she works and regardless of how the firm fares.  At a theoretical level, such a claim can 
be disputed.  On the one hand, the short-run insulation of the worker from the effects of 
her varying quantity or quality of effort need not imply the total absence of a connection, 
since the wage can be adjusted over time, including by performance-contingent 
promotions.  Efficiency wage models also demonstrate the potential to elicit effort   5
through the threat of firing for sub-par performance.  A company’s very survival may 
depend on the effort it obtains from its workforce.  On the other hand, if workers share 
equally or according to predetermined proportions in the same pool of profit, then the 
incentive provided by profit-sharing suffers from the profit’s dilution among many 
workers, and the prediction of a static or finitely repeated model of effort choice is that 
rational workers will choose to free ride.   
 
Despite this inconclusiveness of theory, empirical studies have given Vanek’s 
intuition about profit-sharing and motivation more support than refutation.  Profit-sharing 
has often appeared to boost work incentives, in part because it changes the dynamics of 
worker-worker interactions—each worker now being far more inclined to show 
disapproval at a co-worker’s slackness.  The prevalence of mutual monitoring in worker-
run firms is associated with concrete cost-saving from using fewer hired supervisors.  
Craig and Pencavel (1995) found total factor productivity to be between 6 and 14% 
higher in worker-owned than in conventional plywood firms.  Weitzman and Kruse 
(1990) found a positive effect of profit-sharing on productivity in a meta-analysis of 
studies of both worker-owned and conventional firms linking pay to profit.  A similar 
finding is recorded by Doucouliagos (1995) in a meta-analysis of studies focusing on the 
effect of worker participation in decision-making.   
 
If worker-run firms don’t actually suffer from dysfunctional responses to changes 
in their economic environments, if they aren’t dissuaded from investing by horizon 
problems, and if they motivate work effort at least as effectively as do conventional 
firms, why aren’t they as common as Mill predicted they would one day be?  Among the 
answers that have been proposed is that control by investors is superior to control by 
workers because investors’ representatives can reach decisions more easily, the idea 
being that investors share a uniform objective of maximizing the firm’s market value, 
whereas workers have multiple interests (job security, pleasant working conditions, 
higher earnings) upon which each may place a different weight, thus defying easy 
consensus (Hansmann, 1990).  Another answer, suggested by Kremer (1997), is that less 
productive workers tend to use the firm’s internal decision process to obtain a flatter 
wage dispersion, which weakens incentives for the more productive workers to stay with 
the firm.  Still another possibility, formalized by Ben-Ner (1984) and Miyazaki (1984) 
based on an earlier suggestion by Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky, is that successful LMFs 
have an incentive to replace retiring members with non-member hired workers, 
concentrating the profits in the hands of a smaller member group which, in the limit, 
collapses to contain only one member, a proprietor.  Studies of the life-cycle of 
cooperatives, from creation to dissolution, find few cases following precisely this 
scenario, but situations in which workers sell their firm to private owners and become 
their employees are reported, e.g. in the U.S. plywood sector. 
 
Possibly the most promising place to search for explanations is in the area of 
financing.  Because inputs are committed before output value is certain and because time 
passes between the utilization of input services and the realization of revenue from 
product sales, firms typically need the services of both risk-bearers and financiers.  There 
is no technical reason why all input suppliers, including workers, could not share in   6
providing these services by accepting payments in the future and by working for shares of 
an uncertain total revenue, rather than for fixed wages.  What is observed, however, is 
consistent with the view that the supply of risk-bearing and financing services follow 
comparative advantage: specialists with greater willingness to bear risk and/or ability to 
pay for inputs up front become the suppliers of equity and debt finance, while workers 
are paid within short intervals in amounts promised in advance and not contingent on the 
firm’s results.  The fact that workers typically have less wealth and thus both less ability 
to supply funds or to finance their consumption from savings, as well as less willingness 
to bear risk, is likely to play an important part in explaining this (Putterman, 1993).  The 
thinness of potential markets for worker partnership shares and thus the absence or 
imperfection of the partnership market may add to the burden that financing their own 
firm imposes on workers (Dow, 2003).  
 
Although workers do accumulate substantial assets in pension funds in the United 
States, risk-aversion (and pension fund regulations) may deter them from investing too 
much of it in their own company or in any other single project.  In a world in which 
wealth was quite equally distributed and was held mainly by workers, workers as 
principal owners of their own firms might still remain rare because workers might prefer 
to hold diversified portfolios containing shares of many firms other than their own. 
 
If control (by managers) and ownership (by shareholders) are in any case 
separated in modern corporations, why not worker control with (outside) shareholder 
ownership?  The fact that the de-linking of ownership and control remains incomplete 
even in those firms where ownership is most diffuse (in other words, the fact that 
shareholders retain ultimate control rights in publicly traded corporations) suggests an 
answer.  Presumably ownership and control are almost universally linked in a market 
economy because the owner, the return on whose investment is subject to so many 
uncertainties, is unwilling to cede control over key decisions affecting that return.  Until 
worker desires for control of their enterprises are strong enough that they are willing to 
bear considerable financial risk, or until market outcomes are altered by government 
interventions facilitating the de-linking of control rights from financial risk-bearing, 
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